Jev caller_attribution: stamp ownership and signing #94
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Jev caller_attribution: stamp ownership and signing
Summary
agent-skills PR #37 adds a
caller_attributionfield to Jev results. It isattribution only: not a cryptographic signature, bounded and charset-checked,
and rejected if it looks like a credential. This issue records who owns the
attribution once it must become an attested signature.
Decision (proposed)
Why
on the #37 design returned:
authority_confusion_risk0.88,attribution_only_safe0.53 (below the 0.69 threshold),stamp_owner=colibri,risk2.06 (~2, needs review before use).docs/plans/JEV-DECISION-GATE.md§6/§7: confidence describes the modelresponse; identity, authorization, freshness, and deterministic checks stay
outside Jev, and projections require provenance.
Scope
authenticated identity.
policy version (separate follow-ups).
Refs
caller_attribution), agent-skills PR #38 (jev.env fix)docs/plans/JEV-DECISION-GATE.md§6, §7Contract recorded and merged:
b7e74ba—docs: record caller_attribution ownership and defer the attestation design(PR #124).JEV-DECISION-GATE.md§7.1:caller_attributionis self-declared provenance metadata produced by the invoking Jev client — not authentication, authorization, a cryptographic signature, or operator approval. Colibri owns the policy contract for any future verified identity/attestation field; none is introduced, and no runtime implementation is implied. Jev output never grants or raises authority (§9).credentials.md: the same statement forcaller_attribution, linked to §7.Deferred, not decided here: the field name, trusted principal, signer, key ownership, signing direction, algorithm, key management, and verification mechanics — tracked in #125.
Ownership (split): agent-skills produces the self-declared field; Colibri owns the policy/provenance contract and future evidence interpretation; the attestation design ( #125 ) owns signer, key, algorithm, and verification.
Closing as resolved by the contract update.